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Abstract 
This chapter explores ongoing shifts in the geometrical patterns of speech 
regulation in Europe. It first sets out the regulatory framework, which comprises 
an array of intertwined legally binding and political standards adopted by the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. It then explains how this framework 
has given rise to, and indeed encouraged, particular geometrical patterns in 
European lawmaking and policymaking. Those patterns have been shaped by an 
awareness that the mass media have been powerful actors in public debate, and 
that their freedom must be safeguarded—within certain agreed limits. They also 
demonstrate a concern that regulation should not curb the development of new 
information and communications technologies and services and new markets for 
such technologies and services. The chapter’s next focus is the recent and 
ongoing shift in existing regulatory patterns, which entails a significant move 
towards foisting greater liability and responsibility on internet intermediaries for 
illegal third party content hosted by them or distributed via their services or 
networks. There is an emergent preference for self-regulatory codes of conduct as 
a regulatory technique. However, as this chapter will argue, the relevant 
European codes of conduct are less voluntary than they may ostensibly seem as 
recent codes of conduct seem to have a coercive undertone. 
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Tarlach McGonagle 
In Europe, as elsewhere in the world, the perennial political and scholarly debates 
about the regulation of expression continue unabated. Fuelled by an incessant 
stream of high-profile controversies, those debates focus increasingly on online 
expression. Do international human rights standards also apply (fully) in the 
online environment? Do they need to be rethought and repurposed? When does 
regulation for free expression pass the tipping point and tumble into regulation of 
free expression? Is it necessary, desirable, or even appropriate to have specific 
regulatory regimes for different types of media platforms in the online 
environment? 
Questions such as these have been asked—and answered—repeatedly since 
the internet first emerged and progressively became a ubiquitous and 
indispensable medium for communication. Yet, in an environment that is so 
dynamic, it is important to keep asking—and answering—these questions, 
because it is not only the technologies themselves that change rapidly, but also 
the public’s understanding of, trust in, and use of those technologies. These 
questions hover around the present chapter, which has been written at a moment 
 
 This chapter repurposes, in places, some earlier work by the author on similar 
themes. 
of growing political and public pushback against the initial enthusiasm for, and 
uptake of, social networking, search, and other services offered by the ‘big tech’ 
companies. 
The chapter explores ongoing shifts in the geometrical patterns of speech 
regulation in Europe. It first sets out the regulatory framework, which comprises 
an array of intertwined legally binding and political standards adopted by the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. It then explains how this framework 
has given rise to, and indeed encouraged, particular geometrical patterns in 
European lawmaking and policymaking. Those patterns have been shaped by an 
awareness that the mass media have been powerful actors in public debate, and 
that their freedom must be safeguarded—within certain agreed limits. They also 
demonstrate a concern that regulation should not curb the development of new 
information and communications technologies and services and new markets for 
such technologies and services. 
The chapter’s next focus is the recent and ongoing shift in existing regulatory 
patterns, which entails a significant move towards foisting greater liability and 
responsibility on internet intermediaries for illegal third party content hosted by 
them or distributed via their services or networks. There is an emergent 
preference for self-regulatory codes of conduct as a regulatory technique. 
However, as this chapter will argue, the relevant European codes of conduct are 
less voluntary than they may ostensibly seem. Whereas in the past, the 
encouragement by public authorities of self-regulation appeared to indicate a 
certain level of trust in a given sector to ‘get its act together’ and to ‘get its own 
actors to step up to the plate’, recent codes of conduct seem to have a coercive 
undertone. The subtext appears to read: if the codes of conduct are not adequately 
adhered to, sanctions will follow. 
1. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
1.1 The Council of Europe 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is the 
centrepiece of protection for the right to freedom of expression in Europe. The 
European Court of Human Rights is the adjudicatory body formally tasked with 
the interpretation of the Convention, which binds all forty-seven Member States 
of the Council of Europe. The structure and scope of Article 10 ECHR are similar 
to those of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—the two leading 
provisions guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression in the United Nations’ 
legal framework. 
Article 10 ECHR opens with a broad statement of the right to freedom of 
expression in its first paragraph. It guarantees a composite right to freedom of 
expression. The component parts of the right are the freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. But no sooner have these freedoms been set 
out, than they are reined in, as the text provides that states shall not be prevented 
from licensing ‘broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises’. The second 
paragraph of Article 10 is a traditional claw-back clause. It provides that the right 
may be subject to certain limitations based on different enumerated grounds, such 
as ‘the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety’, ‘the 
prevention of disorder or crime’, and ‘the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others’. 
Article 10(2) justifies the permissibility of such limitations by linking them to 
the ‘duties and responsibilities’ that govern the exercise of the right. The scope of 
those duties and responsibilities varies, depending on the ‘situation’ of the person 
exercising the right and on the ‘technical means’ used.1 The Court usually 
explores the nature and scope of relevant duties and responsibilities not through 
broad principles, but on a case-by-case basis. It tends to distinguish among 
different professional occupations, such as journalism, politics, education, and 
military service. It also tends to distinguish between the perceived reach and 
influence of different media, such as the printed press, audiovisual media, and 
internet and social media.2 
The Court has by and large interpreted Article 10 expansively and in a way 
that is faithful to the broad principles of freedom of expression. Its approach is, 
simply stated: the right to freedom of expression is the rule; any limitations on 
the right are the exception. When assessing whether an interference with the right 
to freedom of expression amounts to a violation of the right, the Court applies a 
standard test. It first establishes whether the impugned measure that has led to the 
interference with the right to freedom of expression is prescribed by law. It then 
determines whether the impugned measure pursues a legitimate aim (in the sense 
 
1 See Fressoz and Roire v France [GC] App. no. 29183/95 (ECtHR, 21 January 
1999) para. 52. 
2 See Jersild v Denmark App. no. 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23 September 1994) para. 
31. 
of Art. 10(2), see earlier). Thirdly, it assesses whether the impugned measure is 
necessary in a democratic society, corresponding to a pressing social need. The 
measure must furthermore be proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) pursued and 
the reasons given by state authorities for the measure must be ‘relevant and 
sufficient’. The Court interprets the adjective ‘necessary’ in a strict fashion. 
In practice, the Court has sought to interpret Article 10 ECHR in a way that 
ensures strong protection for freedom of expression and robust public debate. As 
the Court famously affirmed in its Handyside judgment, information and ideas 
which ‘offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population’ must be 
allowed to circulate in order to safeguard the ‘pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”’.3 Recent case 
law from the Court suggests that this so-called Handyside principle actually 
extends to much of the offensive, unsavoury, and vulgar content that is widely 
available on the internet. However, a red line marking the outer limits of 
protected expression can be traced around the contours of hate speech. 
The term ‘hate speech’ does not appear in the text of the Convention. The 
Court has been using the term since 1999, but it has never defined the term. ‘Hate 
speech’ typically falls under Article 17—the Convention’s ‘Prohibition of abuse 
of rights’ provision. Article 17 aims to prevent any state, group, or person from 
engaging in any activity (including expression) directed at the destruction of any 
of the rights enshrined in the Convention or the limitation of those rights to an 
extent greater than is provided for in the Convention. Article 17 can therefore be 
 
3 See Handyside v United Kingdom App. no. 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976) 
para. 49. 
seen as a safety valve that denies protection to acts that seek to undermine the 
Convention and go against its letter and spirit. In the past, the Court has applied 
Article 17 to ensure that Article 10 protection is not extended to racist, 
xenophobic, or anti-Semitic speech; statements denying, disputing, minimizing, 
or condoning the Holocaust, or (neo-)Nazi ideas.4 This means that, in practice, 
sanctions for racist speech do not violate the right to freedom of expression of 
those uttering the racist speech. In prima facie cases of hate speech, the Court 
will apply Article 17 in a straightforward fashion. This usually leads to a finding 
that a claim is manifestly ill-founded, and the claim is accordingly declared 
inadmissible. Such a finding means that the Court will not examine the substance 
of the claim because it blatantly goes against the values of the Convention. That 
is why Article 17 is sometimes referred to as a ‘guillotine’ provision.5 However, 
the criteria used by the Court for resorting to Article 17 (as opposed to Art. 10(2)) 
 
4 See Tarlach McGonagle, ‘The Council of Europe against online hate speech: 
Conundrums and challenges’, Expert paper, doc. no. MCM 2013(005) (the 
Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Media and 
Information Society, ‘Freedom of Expression and Democracy in the Digital 
Age: Opportunities, Rights, Responsibilities’, Belgrade, 7–8 November 2013). 
5 See Françoise Tulkens, ‘When to say is to do: Freedom of expression and hate 
speech in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Josep 
Casadevall, Egbert Myjer, Michael O’Boyle, and Anna Austin (eds), Freedom 
of Expression: Essays in honour of Nicolas Bratza (Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2012) 284. 
are unclear, leading to divergent jurisprudence.6 How the term ‘hate speech’ is 
understood and delineated is very important when it comes to determining what 
measures the media and internet intermediaries should take to counter types of 
expression that (may) amount to hate speech. 
The Court has developed a corpus of case law from which it has distilled a set 
of key free expression principles relating specifically to the media and journalists. 
The Court considers public debate to be of paramount importance for well-
functioning democratic societies. It has repeatedly recalled the important 
contributions that the media, journalists, and—increasingly—other actors can 
make to public debate. It has recognized that the media: disseminate information 
and ideas widely and thereby contribute to public opinion-forming; perform a 
public watchdog role by keeping governmental and other powerful forces in 
society under scrutiny; and create shared fora in which public debate can take 
place. It has held time and again that the public not only have the right to receive 
information about matters of general interest to society, but the media have the 
duty to impart such information. In order to enable the media to carry out the key 
roles ascribed to them in democratic societies, the Court has carved out specific 
freedoms for them, such as the protection of confidential sources, presentational 
and editorial freedom, freedom to report and comment—including with recourse 
to exaggeration and provocation. 
 
6 See Hannes Cannie and Dirk Voorhoof, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of 
Expression in the European Human Rights Convention: An Added Value for 
Democracy and Human Rights Protection?’ (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 54–83. 
With the advent and growing influence of the internet, the Court has had to 
figure out how far and how fast the principles it had developed for the media 
would travel in the online world. It has progressively recognized that the roles 
that were traditionally the preserve of the media and journalists can also be 
carried out—to varying degrees—by a growing range of (non-media) actors. 
Examples include NGOs, academics, whistle-blowers, citizen journalists, 
bloggers, and ordinary individuals.7 The Court has identified a positive obligation 
for states under the ECHR to create a favourable environment for participation in 
public debate by everyone and to enable the expression of opinions and ideas 
without fear.8 
To meet the challenge of applying its principles in the digital age, the Court 
has sought to stand firm on familiar shores, but it has also sought to set sail for 
and explore new horizons. This has led to an approach that could be described as 
‘adaptive replication’. The Court has sought to replicate its media freedom 
standards in respect of the internet, but in a way that is adaptive to distinctive 
features of the online environment. 
 
7 See, by way of indicative example, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary [GC] 
App. no. 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016). 
8 See Dink v Turkey App. nos 2668/07 and four others (ECtHR, 14 September 
2010) para. 137. For analysis, see Tarlach McGonagle, ‘Positive obligations 
concerning freedom of expression: mere potential or real power?’ in Onur 
Andreotti (ed.), Journalism at risk: Threats, challenges and perspectives 
(Council of Europe Publishing 2015) 9–35. 
After a somewhat slow start, the Court is now steadily developing a corpus of 
‘internet’ case law. A cornerstone of that case law is the acknowledgement that 
the internet ‘has become one of the principal means for individuals to exercise 
their right to freedom of expression today: it offers essential tools for 
participation in activities and debates relating to questions of politics or public 
interest’.9 Thus, a measure resulting in the wholesale blocking of Google sites in 
Turkey ‘by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, substantially 
restricted the rights of Internet users and had a significant collateral effect’.10 In a 
communications environment where the internet is of central importance, 
intermediaries have gained influence and power over the shaping public debate. 
The Court has described them as ‘protagonists of the free electronic media’11 and 
it has referred to the ‘important role’ played by information society service 
providers ‘in facilitating access to information and debate on a wide range of 
political, social and cultural topics’.12 
 
9 See <ibt>Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App. no. 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 December 
2012)</ibt> para. 54. 
10 ibid. para. 66 and Cengiz and Others v Turkey App. nos 48226/10 and 
14027/11 (ECtHR, 1 December 2015) para. 64. 
11 See Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v Hungary 
App. no. 22947/13 (ECtHR, 2 February 2016) para. 88 (and para. 69). 
12 Tamiz v United Kingdom App. no. 3877/14 (ECtHR, 12 October 2017) para. 
90. 
All of this is in line with earlier observations by the Court that the internet is 
qualitatively different from other media technologies, ‘in particular as regards the 
capacity to store and transmit information’.13 Nevertheless, the Court is clearly 
still navigating its way from the shoreline of familiar principles towards the new 
digital horizons. It still tends to measure new media against the yardstick of print 
and audiovisual media. As recently as 2013, it found that information on the 
internet and social media ‘does not have the same synchronicity or impact as 
broadcasted information’.14 It noted that notwithstanding ‘the significant 
development of the internet and social media in recent years, there is no evidence 
of a sufficiently serious shift in the respective influences of the new and of the 
broadcast media in the [UK] to undermine the need for special measures for the 
latter’.15 On the other hand, the Court has been willing to explore and accept the 
importance for free expression online of novel technological features of the new 
communications environment, such as hyperlinking.16 
In the light of the complexity of the current-day communications 
environment, the Court has underscored the increased importance of the duties 
 
13 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine App. no. 33014/05 
(ECtHR, 5 May 2011) para. 63. 
14 <ibt>Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom [GC] App. no. 
48876/08 (ECtHR 2013) para. 119</ibt>. 
15 ibid. 
16 See Magyar Jeti Zrt v Hungary App. no. 11257/16 (ECtHR, 4 December 
2018). 
and responsibilities that govern the exercise of the right to freedom of expression 
and the pursuit of journalistic activities.17 It also sees it as a task for states’ 
authorities to develop a legal (and policy) framework clarifying issues such as 
liability and responsibility.18 
Whereas the Court’s so-called internet case law generally extols the 
informational abundance and communicative potential of the medium, its 
judgment in Delfi AS v Estonia, which dealt with harmful aspects of online 
expression, threw a proverbial spanner in the works.19 
In the case of Delfi AS v Estonia, the Estonian courts had held a large online 
news portal liable for the unlawful third party comments posted on its site in 
response to one of its own articles, despite having an automated filtering system 
and a notice-and-takedown procedure in place. Delfi removed the comments on 
the same day that it was requested to do so by the lawyer of the person most 
directly implicated by the comments. However, that was some six weeks after the 
publication of the article to which the comments reacted. The Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights held that the national courts’ finding of 
liability did not violate Delfi’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 
ECHR. The Grand Chamber’s findings were not unanimous, however: Judges 
Sajó and Tsotsoria penned a lengthy and very strongly worded joint dissenting 
opinion. The judgment has proved very controversial, particularly among free 
 
17 See Stoll v Switzerland [GC] App. no. 69698/01 (ECtHR, 10 December 2007). 
18 Inferred from Editorial Board (n. 13) para. 63. 
19 See <ibt>Delfi AS v Estonia [GC] App. no. 64569/09 (ECtHR, 16 June 
2015)</ibt>. 
speech advocates, who fear that such liability would create proactive monitoring 
obligations for internet intermediaries, leading to private censorship and a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression. 
Several criticisms have been levelled at the Delfi judgment. First, the Court 
took the view that ‘the majority of the impugned comments amounted to hate 
speech or incitements to violence and as such did not enjoy the protection of 
Article 10’.20 By classifying the comments as such extreme forms of speech, the 
Court purports to legitimize the stringent measures that it sets out for online news 
portals to take against such manifestly unlawful content. The dissenting judges 
objected to this approach, pointing out that ‘[t]hroughout the whole judgment the 
description or characterisation of the comments varies and remains non-specific’ 
and ‘murky’.21 
Secondly, the Court endorses the view of the Estonian Supreme Court that 
Delfi could have avoided liability if it had removed the impugned comments 
‘without delay’.22 This requirement is problematic because, as pointed out by the 
dissenting judges, it is not linked to notice or actual knowledge23 and paves the 
way for systematic, proactive monitoring of third party content. 
 
20 ibid. para. 136. 
21 ibid. Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajó and Tsotsoria, paras 12 and 13, 
respectively. 
22 ibid. para. 153. 
23 ibid. Joint Dissenting Opinion para. 8. 
Thirdly, the Court underscored that Delfi was ‘a professionally managed 
Internet news portal run on a commercial basis which sought to attract a large 
number of comments on news articles published by it’.24 The dissenting judges 
aptly argued that the economic activity of the news portal does not cancel out the 
potential of comment sections for facilitating individual contributions to public 
debate in a way that ‘does not depend on centralised media decisions’.25 
Fourthly, the Court was at pains to stress that ‘the case does not concern other 
fora on the Internet where third-party comments can be disseminated . . .’,26 but 
again, this did not wash for the dissenting judges.27 
It is noteworthy that the Court has distinguished the Delfi case and a string of 
subsequent cases on the basis of the nature of the comments. Whereas it had 
found that some of the comments in Delfi amounted to hate speech, it described 
the comments at issue in the MTE & Index.hu case as ‘offensive and vulgar’, but 
found that they ‘did not constitute clearly unlawful speech’ and ‘certainly did not 
amount to hate speech or incitement to violence’.28 The Court followed this line 
in its inadmissibility decision in Pihl v Sweden, a case involving a defamatory 
blogpost and an anonymous online comment.29 Similarly, in Savva Terentyev v 
 
24 ibid. para. 144. 
25 ibid. Joint Dissenting Opinion paras 39 and 28. 
26 ibid. para. 116. 
27 ibid. Joint Dissenting Opinion para. 9. 
28 Magyar (n. 11) para. 64. 
29 See Pihl v Sweden (dec.) App. no. 74742/14 (ECtHR, 7 February 2017). 
Russia, the Court did not hide its repulsion at the language at the centre of the 
case, describing it as ‘framed in very strong words’ and as ‘largely [using] vulgar, 
derogatory and vituperative terms’.30 However, after deep contextual 
examination, it did not classify the impugned expression as ‘hate speech’. The 
impugned expression was a diatribe against the police, posted as a comment on 
an online blog. 
This distinction between offensive and vulgar expression and hate speech is 
of major significance, even if it is sometimes difficult to determine in practice. 
Hate speech—and other types of extreme speech such as incitement to violence 
and/or terrorist activities—may justify far-reaching restrictions on freedom of 
expression and imply heightened responsibilities for internet intermediaries to 
prevent the dissemination of such types of expression via their sites and services. 
This, at least, seems to be the Court’s approach in the Delfi case and its progeny. 
Besides the ECHR, the Council of Europe uses various other instruments—
other treaties and political standard-setting texts—to address media and internet 
freedom and regulation. The Committee of Ministers, for instance, has adopted 
numerous Declarations and Recommendations dealing with topics such as a new 
notion of media; freedom of expression, association, and assembly with regard to 
privately operated internet platforms and online service providers; human rights 
and search engines, and human rights and social networking services. Among 
these political standard-setting texts, there is a discernible—and growing—
emphasis on the responsibilities of internet intermediaries. 
 
30 Savva Terentyev v Russia App. no. 10692/09 (ECtHR, 28 August 2018) para. 
67. See also Pihl v Sweden (n. 29) para. 73. 
For instance, in its Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 to Member States on 
the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries, the Committee of 
Ministers observes that internet intermediaries ‘facilitate interactions on the 
internet between natural and legal persons by offering and performing a variety 
of functions and services’.31 If further states that ‘[o]wing to the multiple roles 
intermediaries play, their corresponding duties and responsibilities and their 
protection under law should be determined with respect to the specific services 
and functions that are performed.’32 
In its Appendix, the Recommendation sets out detailed and extensive 
Guidelines for states on actions to be taken vis-à-vis internet intermediaries with 
due regard to their roles and responsibilities. The Guidelines have a dual focus: 
obligations of states and responsibilities of internet intermediaries. The identified 
obligations of states include ensuring: the legality of measures adopted, legal 
certainty and transparency, safeguards for freedom of expression, privacy and 
data protection, and access to an effective remedy. The responsibilities of internet 
intermediaries include: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
transparency and accountability, responsibilities in respect of content moderation, 
the use of personal data, and ensuring access to an effective remedy. 
1.2 The European Union 
 
31 <ibt>Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries (7 
March 2018) Preamble</ibt>, para. 4. 
32 ibid. para. 11. 
The EU, too, has a multilayered regulatory framework containing provisions on 
freedom of expression, the media, and internet intermediaries. It comprises 
primary and secondary EU law, as well as non-legislative acts, and is 
supplemented by self- and co-regulatory mechanisms. A selection of the 
framework’s most salient focuses will now be presented by way of general 
overview. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is the EU’s 
flagship instrument for the protection of human rights. Since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009, the Charter has acquired the same legal 
status as the EU Treaties, thereby enhancing its relevance. The Charter’s 
provisions ‘are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States 
only when they are implementing Union law’ (Art. 51(1)). The Charter’s 
provisions ‘which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and 
executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, 
and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the 
exercise of their respective powers’ (Art. 52(5)). However, they shall be 
‘judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on 
their legality’ (ibid.). Insofar as the Charter recognizes fundamental rights 
resulting from the constitutional traditions common to EU Member States, those 
rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions (Art. 52(4)). 
It is important to ensure that the human rights standards elaborated by the 
Council of Europe and the EU are broadly consistent or equivalent. This is 
important from the point of view of legal consistency within Europe. In keeping 
with this line of thinking, the Charter provides that insofar as the Charter contains 
rights that correspond to those safeguarded by the ECHR, ‘the meaning and scope 
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by’ the Convention (Art. 
52(3)). This reference to the Convention includes the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights.33 Article 11 of the Charter—which focuses on freedom 
of expression, as well as media freedom and pluralism—should therefore be 
interpreted consistently with Article 10 of the Convention and relevant case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. The text of Article 11 of the Charter is 
in any case modelled on Article 10 of the Convention, but is more succinctly 
formulated. All of this means that the principles from relevant case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (set out earlier) ought to govern the 
interpretation of Article 11 of the Charter by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). 
At the level of secondary EU law, a number of Directives are relevant, in 
particular the e-Commerce Directive and the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive. 
The main aim of the e-Commerce Directive is to seek ‘to contribute to the 
proper functioning of the internal market by ensuring the free movement of 
information society services between the Member States’.34 The Directive is 
 
33 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2006) 400. 
34 <ibt>Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1</ibt>, Art. 1. 
premised on a contemporary understanding of how internet intermediaries 
worked in 2000 when the Directive was adopted, namely that intermediaries 
either have a passive or an active relationship with third party content 
disseminated through their networks or services. In the logic of this binary 
distinction, the drafters of the Directive sought to ensure that passive 
intermediaries would not be held liable for content over which they had no 
knowledge or control. The Directive thus establishes a ‘safe harbour’ regime for 
passive intermediaries. 
The safe harbour regime entails exemptions from liability in ‘cases where the 
activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical 
process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which 
information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, 
for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of 
a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the 
information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over 
the information which is transmitted or stored’.35 These exemptions are set out in 
Articles 12 to 14 of the Directive and they can be availed of by service providers 
acting as a ‘mere conduit’ for information, or those which provide ‘caching’ or 
‘hosting’ services. This means that intermediaries which serve as hosting 
providers would ordinarily benefit from an exemption for liability for illegal 
content, as long as they maintain a neutral or passive stance towards that content. 
A service provider that hosts third party content may avail of this exemption on 
condition that it does not have ‘actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
 
35 ibid. recital 42. 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent’ and that 
‘upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to 
disable access to the information’.36 However, ‘the removal or disabling of access 
has to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression 
and of procedures established for this purpose at national level’.37 Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Directive, EU Member States are not allowed to impose a 
general obligation on providers to ‘monitor the information which they transmit 
or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity’. The type of surveillance that such a general 
monitoring obligation would entail would have a chilling effect on the freedom of 
expression of users of the service. 
The binary distinction between passive and active intermediaries that 
informed the drafting of the e-Commerce Directive has long been under strain. It 
no longer adequately reflects the complexity of the relationship between 
intermediaries and third party content today. Ongoing technological 
developments have enabled intermediaries to engage in a range of activities that 
move beyond passive hosting towards presentational, recommendation, ranking, 
and editorial functions. Such activities place the binary distinction under strain 
because exemption from liability is based on an objective distance from content 
created by third party users. 
 
36 ibid. Art. 14. 
37 ibid. recital 46. 
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive seeks to ensure a minimum level 
of harmonization across the EU of national legislation governing audiovisual 
media services, with a view to removing obstacles to the free movement of such 
services within the EU’s single market. In pursuance of these aims, the Directive 
coordinates a number of areas: general principles; jurisdiction; incitement to 
hatred; accessibility for persons with disabilities; major events; the promotion 
and distribution of European works; commercial communications; and protection 
of minors. 
The Directive has evolved from the former Television without Frontiers 
Directive, and covers traditional television broadcasting as well as on-demand 
audiovisual media services. Following the revision of the Directive in 2018, the 
providers of video-sharing platform services will henceforth also fall under the 
scope of the Directive, insofar as they are covered by the definition of such 
services. The definition is rather convoluted: 
‘video-sharing platform service’ means a service as defined by 
Articles 56 and 57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, where the principal purpose of the service or of a 
dissociable section thereof or an essential functionality of the 
service is devoted to providing programmes, user-generated 
videos, or both, to the general public, for which the video-sharing 
platform provider does not have editorial responsibility, in order to 
inform, entertain or educate, by means of electronic 
communications networks within the meaning of point (a) of 
Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC and the organisation of which is 
determined by the video-sharing platform provider, including by 
automatic means or algorithms in particular by displaying, tagging 
and sequencing. 
The thinking behind this shift is that privately owned internet intermediaries exert 
organizational control over third party content; they determine the modalities of 
how that content is made available, its level of prominence, and so on. If they de 
facto control what their users see and how they see it, they should also be held 
responsible or liable for the content—even though they do not have editorial 
control over it. Recital 47 of the Directive spells out this thinking in relation to 
video-sharing platforms in the context of the Directive: 
A significant share of the content provided on video-sharing 
platform services is not under the editorial responsibility of the 
video-sharing platform provider. However, those providers 
typically determine the organisation of the content, namely 
programmes, user-generated videos and audiovisual commercial 
communications, including by automatic means or algorithms. 
Therefore, those providers should be required to take appropriate 
measures to protect minors from content that may impair their 
physical, mental or moral development. They should also be 
required to take appropriate measures to protect the general public 
from content that contains incitement to violence or hatred 
directed against a group or a member of a group on any of the 
grounds referred to in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), or the dissemination 
of which constitutes a criminal offence under Union law. 
This line of thinking has been criticized for resulting in ‘considerable political 
and social pressure [being] exerted on these platforms to resolve the problems 
“themselves”’.38 This, in turn, ‘leads to a “spiral of privatised regulation”’.39 
The applicability of the Directive to the providers of video-sharing platform 
services does not concern all provisions of the Directive. The focus is very much 
on content that is damaging for minors, incitement to violence or hatred, and 
public provocation to commit a terrorist offences (but there is also attention for 
requirements for audiovisual commercial communications). Article 28b is the 
operative provision in this regard. It reads: 
<lext>1. Without prejudice to Articles 12 to 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC, 
Member States shall ensure that video- sharing platform providers 
under their jurisdiction take appropriate measures to protect: 
(a)  minors from programmes, user-generated videos and 
audiovisual commercial communications which may impair 
their physical, mental or moral development in accordance with 
Article 6a(1); 
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(b)  the general public from programmes, user-generated videos and 
audiovisual commercial communications containing incitement 
to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a 
member of a group based on any of the grounds referred to in 
Article 21 of the Charter; 
(c)  the general public from programmes, user-generated videos and 
audiovisual commercial communications containing content the 
dissemination of which constitutes an activity which is a 
criminal offence under Union law, namely public provocation 
to commit a terrorist offence as set out in Article 5 of Directive 
(EU) 2017/541, offences concerning child pornography as set 
out in Article 5(4) of Directive 2011/93/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (*) and offences concerning 
racism and xenophobia as set out in Article 1 of Framework 
Decision 2008/913/JHA.</lext> 
Bringing video-sharing platform providers under the Directive stretches both the 
material scope and the underlying logic of the Directive. Be that as it may, the 
move reflects a clear anxiety about the prevalence of particular types of harmful 
content on video-sharing platforms and their influence on the public. The move 
seeks to ensure that the selected types of harmful content cannot slip through any 
regulatory meshes between the nets of the e-Commerce Directive and the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. The three types of harmful content have 
been singled out for far-reaching restrictions over and above other types of (less) 
harmful content. A similar distinction in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has also been observed (see further earlier in the chapter). 
Besides the aforementioned Directives—both of which are traditional forms 
of regulation, it is also apposite to pay attention to self- and co-regulatory 
systems, and non-legislative measures in this area. The European Union has a 
history of advocating the use of self-regulatory mechanisms as the most 
appropriate form of regulating the internet and mobile technologies, due to 
constant technological developments in those areas. According to the revised 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive: ‘Self-regulation constitutes a type of 
voluntary initiative which enables economic operators, social partners, non- 
governmental organisations and associations to adopt common guidelines 
amongst themselves and for themselves. They are responsible for developing, 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with those guidelines’ (recital 14). 
Self-regulation, with the flexibility it offers, is seen as a suitable means of 
regulating certain aspects of media, internet, and mobile technologies. For 
instance, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Art. 4a) encourages EU 
Member States to explore the suitability of self- and/or co-regulatory 
techniques.40 Similarly, both the e-Commerce Directive (Art. 16)41 and the 
 
40 See Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision 
of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) 
(codified version) [2010] OJ L95/1, as revised by Directive 2018/1808 of 14 
November 2018, [2018] OJ L-303/69. 
former Data Protection Directive (Art. 27)42 (have) stress(ed) the importance of 
codes of conduct; approaches which represent a tentative move away from 
traditional regulatory techniques in the direction of self-regulation. 
2. GEOMETRICAL SHIFTS 
For several decades, the mass media—print and broadcast—held sway as ‘the 
central institution of a democratic public sphere’.43 In today’s increasingly 
digitized society, the mass media have ceded that position to, or are at least 
sharing it with, a growing number of other new media actors. These actors do not 
usually fall within the ambit of traditional media regulatory regimes. This has 
made it much more challenging to regulate expression in the online 
environment.44 
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Internet intermediaries are important actors in the online environment. Due to 
their gate-keeping functions, they can facilitate or obstruct access to the online 
fora in which public debate is increasingly conducted.45 Intermediaries with 
search and/or recommendation functions, typically driven by algorithms, have 
far-reaching influence on the availability, accessibility, visibility, findability, and 
prominence of particular content. The operators of social network services, for 
instance, ‘possess the technical means to remove information and suspend 
accounts’, which makes them ‘uniquely positioned to delimit the topics and set 
the tone of public debate’.46 Search engines, for their part, have the aim and the 
ability to make information more accessible and prominent; which gives them 
influence over how people find information and ideas and over what kinds of 
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information and ideas they find.47 Both of these types of internet intermediary 
therefore have clear ‘discursive significance’ in society.48 
The term ‘online platform’ is being used increasingly in scholarship, 
sometimes thoughtfully and sometimes loosely, to denote a particular type of 
online actor. The term has come to the fore in policymaking discussions and 
processes. It has been described as ‘a programmable digital architecture designed 
to organize interactions between users—not just end users but also corporate 
entities and public bodies’.49 It is furthermore ‘geared toward the systematic 
collection, algorithmic processing, circulation, and monetization of user data’.50 
The combination of actions and interactions enabled by platforms, and their 
complexity, demonstrate that they are qualitatively different to traditional media, 
and that the regulatory framework for traditional media cannot straightforwardly 
be extended to online platforms. 
Some authors speak of the datafication and platformization of society and the 
Internet of Things. Ongoing developments and trends have prompted the 
observation that ‘[p]latform mechanisms shape every sphere of life, whether 
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markets or commons, private or public spheres’.51 All of this is pointing towards 
the dislodging of the mass media as the central institution in democratic societies. 
A more abundant, but fragmented, information offer has emerged instead, with 
new gate-keepers controlling its flow. 
Internet intermediary liability has been the subject of extensive academic 
examination, from a variety of perspectives, such as accountability issues,52 tort 
law,53 freedom of expression,54 and copyright.55 Some authors have detected a 
recent shift of focus in (the discourse around) relevant lawmaking and 
policymaking. They have pointed to an ongoing movement from intermediary 
and platform liability to responsibility.56 
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This is an insightful reading of current regulatory and policy discussions and 
developments. At the Council of Europe, the Delfi judgment underscored the 
requirement for certain types of internet intermediaries to take strong and 
effective measures against hate speech (although the Grand Chamber of the Court 
was at pains to stress that the wider ramifications of the judgment were limited). 
Standard-setting instruments by the Committee of Ministers stress that the human 
rights responsibilities of internet intermediaries should guide all of their 
activities. 
Under EU law, the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive has created 
new obligations for video-sharing platforms to prevent the dissemination of 
certain types of harmful illegal content via their services. The new Directive on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market also contains provisions 
that create liability for internet intermediaries for unauthorized communication to 
the public of copyrighted works.57 Under Article 17 of the Directive, ‘online 
content-sharing service providers shall be liable for unauthorised acts of 
communication to the public, including making available to the public, of 
copyright-protected works and other subject matter’, save in certain limited 
 
from Concepts to Safeguards (Intersentia 2018). See also John Naughton, 
‘Platform Power and Responsibility in the Attention Economy’ in Martin 
Moore and Damian Tambini (eds), Digital Dominance: the Power of Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (OUP 2018) 371–95. 
57 See Directive 2019/790/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and 
amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC [2019] OJ L130/92. 
circumstances. This provision has sparked fears that it will lead in practice to the 
installation of upload filters to pre-empt the sharing of copyright-protected works 
in a strategy to avoid liability for the unauthorized communication to the public 
of such works. 
These legislative developments continue a wider-sweeping policy line set out 
by the European Commission in its Communication, ‘Tackling Illegal Content 
Online: Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms’.58 The title of 
the Communication accurately encapsulates its intent. The Communication 
provides guidance to online service providers in respect of their responsibilities 
vis-à-vis illegal online content. The Commission took the opportunity to 
announce that it would assess whether additional measures were needed, 
including by monitoring progress on the basis of existing voluntary arrangements 
among service providers. The Communication was followed by a 
Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online, which 
‘builds on and consolidates the progress made in the framework of voluntary 
arrangements agreed between hosting service providers and other affected service 
providers regarding different types of illegal content’.59 
Other current legislative proposals similarly follow this policy line, for 
example the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
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Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online.60 The 
proposed Regulation seeks to ‘provide clarity as to the responsibility of hosting 
service providers in taking all appropriate, reasonable and proportionate actions 
necessary to ensure the safety of their services and to swiftly and effectively 
detect and remove terrorist content online, taking into account the fundamental 
importance of the freedom of expression and information in an open and 
democratic society’.61 
This new wave of EU law and policy consistently mentions the need to take 
into account or have regard for fundamental rights safeguards and existing 
provisions for exemptions for liability under the e-Commerce Directive. It is very 
important that this does not become mere lip-service and that the new wave of 
EU law and policy does not wash over or wash away fundamental rights 
safeguards.62 
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A selection of policy and ostensibly self-regulatory initiatives deserve 
mention at this juncture as they are indicative of one of the main ongoing shifts in 
the geometry of European regulation, namely codes of conduct against online 
hate speech and online disinformation. In May 2016, at the behest of the 
European Commission, the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech 
Online was adopted by a number of leading multinational tech companies. The 
initial signatories were Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube (owned by 
Google), with other companies joining later: Instagram (owned by Facebook), 
Google+, Snapchat, and Dailymotion in 2018 and Jeuxvideo.com in 2019. Under 
the Code, the signatory IT companies commit inter alia ‘to review the majority of 
valid notifications for removal of illegal hate speech in less than 24 hours and 
remove or disable access to such content, if necessary’. Compliance with the 
Code is monitored by way of annual evaluations; the fourth evaluation took place 
in December 2018. As in the previous annual evaluations, the Commission and 
the IT companies were self-congratulatory about the high statistics provided 
about the speed of reviewing and high removal rate of illegal hate speech from 
their services. The IT companies review an average of 89 per cent of notifications 
of illegal hate speech within twenty-four hours and they are removing 72 per cent 
of the illegal hate speech notified to them.63 
 
Fundamental Rights, Opinion 2/2019—Online Terrorist Content (February 
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The aim and achievement of cleaning up the internet’s cesspools64 is 
laudable, and the expeditious removal or disabling of hate speech from online 
networks is to be welcomed. However, concerns persist about the risk of private 
censorship by the actors responsible for the decisions to remove or disable 
particular types of content. There is particular concern about the risk of over-
censorship and the removal of content ‘to be on the safe side’ and to thereby 
avoid incurring liability for such content. Reporting under the Code reveals little 
about the processes and criteria used to make such decisions—despite the Code’s 
professed commitment to enhancing the transparency of such processes. The 
focus of the IT companies’ reporting so far has been predominantly on statistics 
about the removal of content and less on other commitments under the Code that 
could contribute to creating an online environment that is more resilient in the 
face of hate speech. Examples include education and awareness-raising and the 
promotion of independent counter-narratives. It is important to appreciate and 
pay attention to the range of responsibilities of the IT companies and not to fixate 
on removal statistics. Existing European and international standards on business 
and human rights underscore the need for a broad understanding of the range of 
responsibilities at issue.65 It is important for the IT companies to demonstrate 
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positional awareness within relevant European and international standards when 
honouring their commitments under the Code. 
At the end of September 2018, representatives of several online platforms, 
social networking service operators and advertising companies agreed on a Code 
of Practice on Disinformation. This initiative should be seen in the context of a 
wider range of efforts by the EU to combat online disinformation, including the 
Commission’s Communication, ‘Tackling online disinformation: a European 
approach’ (April 2018), and an Action Plan against Disinformation (December 
2018). Google, Facebook, Twitter, Mozilla, and the trade associations 
representing the advertising sector submitted their first reports on the measures 
they are taking to comply with the Code of Practice on Disinformation at the end 
of January 2019.66 The European Commission gave the reports a guarded 
welcome, while urging the signatories to improve and/or increase the measures 
they have taken. Each signatory chooses the most relevant commitments for its 
own company—in the light of the services it offers and actions it performs—from 
a list of possible commitments. The Commission has reminded/cautioned the 
signatories about the possibility of a legislative backstop in this area. The 
Commission has stated that should the results of the envisaged comprehensive, 
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twelve-month assessment of the operation of the Code of Practice in December 
2019 prove unsatisfactory, it may take further action, including of a regulatory 
nature. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
It is little wonder that the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human 
Rights are moving tentatively from one shore to another in their approach to 
media freedom and regulation in the digital age. As the Delfi judgment appears to 
put greater onus on internet intermediaries—in particular circumstances—to 
tackle hate speech over which they can exert control, it is essential not to lose 
sight of the free expression principles that have guided the Court’s approach in 
the analogue world. That the Court has emphasized those principles repeatedly in 
the post-Delfi case law may suggest that the critical backlash against that 
judgment has not gone unheard within the Court. The Committee of Ministers is 
pushing for internet intermediaries to show a greater sense of ambition and 
initiative when it comes to identifying and fulfilling their human rights 
responsibilities. 
A continuing challenge and source of tension involves the delineation of the 
term hate speech; that is, the demarcation line between types of harmful 
expression that ordinarily are entitled to protection and the most harmful types of 
expression that attack the values of the ECHR and therefore do not enjoy 
protection. It is very important that the Court provides as much clarity and 
clarification as possible, in the light of the growing expectations on internet 
intermediaries to take effective measures to counter and prevent hate speech, 
terrorist content, and other such content. There is a correlation between the 
seriousness of the perceived harms of certain categories of expression and the 
expectation of heightened responsibility on the part of internet intermediaries to 
provide effective protection against them. 
This is precisely the dilemma that is dogging the current EU approach, which 
is increasingly shifting the burden of policing content to private actors because 
they have the technical capacity to take preventive and removal/blocking actions. 
However, the lack of legal legitimacy of private actors to carry out such public 
tasks and the absence of transparency and accountability for how they actually 
exercise their censorial power in this regard, raises a range of pressing 
fundamental rights concerns. Internet intermediaries are now coming under 
increasing pressure to live up to their corporate social and human rights 
responsibilities in markets where their corporate interests dominate, but where 
there is a pending possibility of sanctions and/or regulation to put steel into 
voluntary commitments entered into by intermediaries. 
The regulatory geometry of internet intermediaries is complex and multi-
dimensional. It is shifting from the relative confidence in a binary understanding 
of passive and active actors to an anxious awe of complicated, multi-functional 
platforms which have reshaped the whole ecosystem in which they operate. More 
shifts in these geometrical patterns are to be expected in order to deal with the 
ongoing platformization of public debate. 
